This study explores the extent to which campaign visibility facilitates electoral participation, using data from first-and second-order elections in Britain. Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, we assess whether the effects of campaign effort are conditioned by marginality, finding that campaign mobilisation gets out the vote regardless of the competitiveness of the race. Second, we look at the relative ability of different campaign activities to stimulate turnout, detecting significant differences. Third, we show that the effects of campaign effort on electoral participation are rather similar in first-and secondorder elections. These findings suggest that a greater level of electoral information provided by campaign activities does reduce the cost of voting. Local campaigns play a key role in bringing voters to the polls in marginal and non-marginal races, and at general elections as much as at second-order elections.
Introduction
Levels of electoral participation function as thermometers of how healthy a democracy is.
When large numbers of citizens fail to turn out to vote, not only do they abstain from making a political choice, but they also signal a wider detachment from the democratic system. In recent decades, there has been a marked decline in party membership, ideological attachment, and 'brand' loyalty, leaving political parties without a strong core of supporters (e.g., Dalton 2008; McAllister 2004 ) and the consequent need to make extra efforts to bring voters to the polling station. The mobilising efforts, engineered by parties and their candidates, are therefore particularly significant at this time. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of these efforts and assess their contribution to the levels of voter turnout.
Campaign mobilisation consists of all of the activities aimed at enhancing the salience of an election in the eyes of the voters, with the ultimate goal of getting out the vote. Experimental evidence shows that citizens are more likely to vote when they are stimulated by exposure to campaign information (Green and Gerber 2008) , and observational studies have confirmed the idea that campaign effort has a discernible positive effect on turnout (Geys 2006; Karp et al. 2008) . We expand this line of research by exploring the link between campaign effort and turnout at first-as well as second-order elections in Britain, deepening our understanding of the similarities and differences between these types of elections. While research on voter turnout is comparative in nature (e.g., Baek 2009; Franklin 1996) , previous studies have focused on the same level of election across countries. This study provides a comparison across different levels of elections within the same country. Next to that, we add nuance to the literature on turnout by addressing whether the effects of campaign effort are conditioned by the competitiveness of the race. Rational reasoning and empirical evidence (Blais 2000) suggests that turnout ought to be higher in competitive races, but the extent to which organised mobilisation effort and electoral competitiveness interact with each other remains unclear. Finally, we explore whether different forms of electioneering vary in their capacity to stimulate electoral participation.
Using data from the 2010 British general election and 2011 devolved elections in Scotland and Wales, we find evidence that aggregate constituency-level campaign spending has strong positive effects on turnout at both types of elections. This effect is, however, not conditioned by the competitiveness of the race, suggesting that the effort put forward by parties and their candidates to get out the vote is equally beneficial in safe as well as marginal seats. The disaggregated analysis of electoral activities offers an additional insight into the effectiveness of electioneering at getting out the vote. We find that different types of campaign effort vary in their capacity to stimulate turnout. Among the various campaign activities that would-be MPs use, providing unsolicited materials to voters emerges as a powerful trigger for electoral mobilisation in first-and second-order elections. In the former, campaign professionalisation also has a positive impact on turnout.
While first-and second-order elections still differ in many aspects, there are also noticeable similarities between the two when looking at how campaign effort can mobilise the electorate. The patterns of how campaign effort promotes electoral mobilisation, albeit with slight tweaks, hold for both the 2010 general election and the 2011 devolved elections.
The article is organised as follows. First, we describe the electoral context in Britain. Second, we survey the existing literature on campaign effort and turnout to specify our contribution.
We then outline our theoretical expectations. Following this, we illustrate data and measures, proceed to the analytical findings, and conclude with a discussion on their implications.
Studying Constituency-Level Electoral Dynamics in Britain
We explore the determinants of turnout variance across different constituencies in Britain, This is not uncharted territory. Among the earliest to point at the local level as crucial for understanding British electoral politics were Denver and Hands (1974) . They explored the role played by local campaigns in getting out the vote at general elections and suggested that campaign spending (used as a proxy for campaign effort) might actually have a bigger impact on mobilising the electorate than constituency marginality. This conclusion is very much in line with findings from the extensive 'get out the vote' literature from the United States (Green et al. 2003; Green and Gerber 2008; Imai 2005; Patterson and Caldeira 1983) and has recently regained scholarly attention in the field of British electoral politics. A conspicuous body of literature has explored the extent to which local campaign effort has an impact on electoral success (e.g., Clarke et al. 2004 Clarke et al. , 2009 Cutts 2014; Fisher et al. 2011; Whiteley and Seyd 1994) and the mobilisation of voters (for the effects of campaign effort on turnout, see Benoit and Marsh 2003b; Karp et al. 2008; Karp and Banducci 2007;  for Britain-specific studies see, among others, Fisher et al. 2011 Fisher et al. , 2015 Pattie et al. 2003) , leading to substantial agreement on its overall positive effect. Local campaigns have been proven to be significant drivers of electoral participation in UK general elections (Fisher et al. 2015; Fisher and Denver 2009; Johnston and Pattie 1998) where parties have demonstrated their ability to target campaign efforts strategically, in order to make gains (or contain losses) where most needed.
While there is little dispute over the effectiveness of campaigning, there are several elements of the process through which campaigns stimulate turnout that remain unclear. First, evidence is still limited to first-order elections. This study investigates the role of campaign mobilisation effort in the context of a general election and devolved elections in order to extend our understanding of the latter and assess how closely the electoral dynamics associated with first-and second-order elections mirror each other. This remains an open puzzle in the field of electoral studies, particularly in the case of Britain. On the one hand, the diversity in terms of electoral systems -i.e., UK general elections exclusively use First-Pastthe-Post, whereas the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales use the Additional Member System -suggests that differences might outweigh similarities. Moreover, elections for the devolved assemblies are characterised by lower turnout levels and different individual-level voting patterns than Westminster elections (Wyn Jones and Scully 2006) . These elements indicate that first-and second-order elections are indeed unconnected electoral arenas and that the defining traits of the latter should make them substantially different from general elections. On the other hand, the 'second-order' nature of the devolved elections is reduced by the strength of these administrations as they have primary legislative power over a wide range of policy areas, but also by the strength of the sub-state identities in question (Jeffery and Hough 2009) . 'Not all second-order elections are equally unimportant' (Marsh 2004) .
Also, for those involved in the mobilisation effort -parties and candidates -there is no difference in the incentives: when running for office, a rational agent should attempt to win, regardless of the type of office in question. As a result, the mobilisation effort should be equally efficacious. Third, if consensus exists on the effectiveness of the overall electoral effort, only a handful of studies break down the various forms of organised mobilisation. Fisher et al. (2015) , using data from a survey of electoral agents, explore the diversity of campaign types and assess the effectiveness of different activities to reiterate that traditional campaign techniques are particularly successful at getting out the vote. Conversely, they find that e-campaigning was ineffective at driving voters to the polling station, outlining the differential effects of various types of mobilisation efforts. Our approach is not too dissimilar but, instead of following a taxonomical approach based on theories of campaign change (e.g., Denver and Hands 2002; Farrell and Webb 2000; Norris 2000) , we rely on the classification of campaign expenses as imposed by legislation. This enables us to identify the extent to which different activities stimulate turnout, while bypassing the limitations of survey data such as non-response and missing values.
Campaign Mobilisation Effort, Competitiveness, and Electoral Participation
When parties and candidates actively engage on the ground by intensifying their efforts to win votes, they simultaneously intensify the public debate surrounding the election in its own right, and push competitors to raise their game in response. Studies of negative campaigns show that the more aggressive the campaign effort, the higher the likelihood of voters casting their ballot.
2 Clearly, this likelihood should be particularly high when the election is expected to be a close race, as the perceived utility of voting is greater in a more marginal constituency than in a safer one. Indeed, previous studies find two constituency-level characteristics to be particularly influential in determining how many people cast a ballot: the marginality of the race and campaign effort (Geys 2006) . While focusing primarily on the latter, we also explore the interaction between these two elements, on the premise that they might condition each other's effect. When an election is a close contest, the probability that one vote might influence the outcome is seen as higher and it acts as an additional motivation to cast a ballot. Matsusaka and Palda (1993) refer to this mechanism as the Downsian closeness hypothesis.
Voters acknowledge that the benefits of casting their ballot are not limited to merely fulfilling their sense of civic duty, which voting in very safe seats is arguably restricted to, but that they may also influence the electoral result. Therefore, more marginal constituencies should experience higher levels of turnout. With regard to campaign effort, the more candidates Nevertheless, there are no strong theoretical reasons to expect that the effects of campaign effort should be any different at second-order elections.
The independent effects of both marginality and campaign effort are well established in the literature. We move forward by exploring the potential moderating role that the closeness of the race may have on the effectiveness of campaign effort at stimulating turnout. There are reasons to expect this to be the case. First, voters in marginal seats are likely to have a greater incentive to pay attention to the electorally relevant information that is made available to them since their vote is seen as more important. Second, marginal constituencies tend to lack strong incumbents; in these circumstances acquiring information on candidates becomes a necessity. This line of reasoning is also supported by Milazzo's (2015) 
From Effort to Efforts
When it comes to capturing campaign effort, both the literature on campaign effectiveness and the studies of mobilisation effects on turnout use some form of proxy to gauge the concept. Most measures in use are very close to one another (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2009) , so that studies based on electoral agent surveys (Denver et al. 2003) can be safely compared to those that are using electoral returns (Johnston and Pattie 1995) or party contact as reported in voter surveys (Clarke et al. 2004; Karp et al. 2008; Whiteley and Seyd 2003) . This was very recently echoed by Fisher et al. (2015) who show a high level of robustness across data from an electoral agent survey and electoral returns.
Here, we rely on electoral returns data to assess the effects of campaign effort on turnout. The obvious advantages are the completeness of electoral returns and their availability for general elections as well as devolved elections. Clearly, these data also have limitations: e.g., spending returns are unable to capture the extent to which a campaign relies on free volunteer labour or how campaign stimuli may be internalised by voters and lead to a higher likelihood of voting. The latter can be adequately disentangled only by experimental research, while the former is a limitation of spending data. That said, the benefits of using electoral returns data compiled by the Electoral Commission are substantial. These data benefit from their completeness -all candidates are subject to the same regulatory provisions on reportingand granularity. This allows us to go beyond interpreting campaign effort as a monolithic activity. To date, the corpus of studies using campaign spending as an indicator of campaign effort, whether addressing its role in increasing turnout or winning votes, tends to rely on aggregate measures of spending. In a comprehensive meta-analysis of the literature, Geys (2006) shows that, while electoral spending is consistently one of the most significant positive predictors of turnout, the distinction between (and comparative impact of) the different types of campaign activities needs further attention. In this respect, electoral returns data, despite certain shortcomings, do a good job of capturing the nuances of electioneering, allowing one to isolate the effects of different campaign activities. 
Data and Measures
We use official electoral expenditure data provided by the Electoral Commission to capture constituency-level campaign effort. These data have several advantages: i) they cover all candidates and parties who stood for election, as declaration of spending is required by law, thus avoiding the problem of missing observations that plagues candidate surveys, ii) they are more accurate than survey-based self-reported measures of campaign spending, iii) data are collected in a compatible manner across the electoral contexts, allowing for comparisons, and iv) they capture campaign effort in a nuanced manner by requiring candidates to indicate how much was spent on all six types of campaign activities listed above. These measures are then integrated with the official election results from the Electoral Commission and constituencylevel socio-economic indicators from the most recent 2011 Census.
Dependent Variable and Core Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable in our study -turnout -is operationalised as the per cent of voters in the constituency who cast a valid vote, ranging from 0 to 100.
Marginality describes the expected openness of the electoral race in a given constituency. It is operationalised as the difference between the vote share of the winner and the runner up at the previous election, with higher values corresponding to a greater margin of victory (i.e., a less competitive constituency). 6 The relevant majority in the constituency is based on the 5 Socio-economic indicators are specific to the constituency boundaries used at the given election. For example, Census data is adapted to match the boundaries of the Scottish Westminster constituencies at the 2010 general election for models on the 2010 general election, and the Scottish Holyrood constituencies for models on the 2011 devolved elections. 6 Estimates from models using dichotomous measure of marginality -i.e., coded as 1 'marginal' if the difference in the vote share of the winner and runner-up was less than 10% at the previous election, and 0 'safe' if it was more than 10% -are robust to the findings presented here and available from the authors.
preceding contest since this represents the status quo ante of local electoral dynamics on which voters base their decisions (Johnston and Pattie 2006) .
7
The second core explanatory variable is total campaign effort in a given constituency during the short campaign. The short campaign is the time between the dissolution of the legislative body and polling day; campaign expenses during this time must be recorded and reported by local campaign teams in all electoral contexts analysed here. 8 The measure we employ is obtained by dividing candidates' cumulative expenditure at the constituency level (i.e., the overall amount spent in the constituency) by the legal spending limit in the constituency. The legal spending limit is a function of electorate size and constituency type, varying across the constituencies. Thus, a relative measure of campaign effort (i.e., dividing absolute spending by the spending limit) is more appropriate than an absolute one when assessing the effects of campaign effort across multiple constituencies in Britain.
9
In a similar vein, we develop six disaggregated constituency-level measures of spending for each type of campaign activity highlighted above -i.e., advertising, unsolicited material, transport, public meetings, staff, accommodation and administration. 10 As per total campaign effort, the six disaggregated measures are operationalised in relative terms where cumulative spending on a particular campaign activity in a constituency is divided by the legal spending limit in the constituency. We incorporate constituency-specific demographic indicators to capture the socio-economic outlook of the constituency in addition to marginality and campaign effort. 12 These indicators tap into distinct elements of the constituency profile. First, we use density to account for the level of population concentration in each constituency. The measure is operationalised as the number of persons per hectare. Although it is sometimes argued that urbanisation should lead to the weakening of inter-personal bonds, a rise in individualism, less personal politics, and less social pressure to cast a vote, empirical evidence remains mixed (Geys 2006) . Second, we include a measure for home ownership to capture the constituency's socio-economic outlook. 13 It is operationalised as the per cent of residents in the constituency who live in owned residence. It is fair to expect that homeowners reside in their community for longer than those who rent, increasing a sense of identification and group solidarity (Ashworth et al.
2002
) and, thereby, adding to the social pressure towards voting (Geys 2006 ). Therefore, a positive effect should be associated with the variable. Third, voting is also likely to be a function of one's social surroundings. We include a control for single occupancy households on the premise that people who do not share their residency are likely to receive fewer social cues associated with voting. For example, they are less likely to talk about the upcoming election at home or be encouraged to go the polling station when their co-habitant does so.
The variable is operationalised as the ratio of single-person households in the constituency, and we expect it to have a negative effect on turnout.
Finally, we explore the effect of the size of the electorate on turnout, measured as the number of eligible voters in the constituency in thousands. As the size of the electorate increases, the probability that a single vote can influence electoral outcome decreases. Therefore, following Downs' (1957) 'calculus-of-voting' model, we expect a larger electorate to lead to a lower turnout. We also control for the geographical location of the constituency (nation) -i.e., we divide constituencies into those that are in England, Scotland, and Wales -, and constituency type by making a distinction between boroughs/burghs and counties. 12 We also ran models with previous turnout, instead of the socio-economic characteristics, as an additional robustness check. It is noted that previous turnout captures the many demographic factors that may contribute to higher or lower levels of turnout (Fisher et al. 2015) . Estimates from these models are robust to the findings presented here (see Appendices B and C). 13 Empirical tests showed that home ownership is very highly correlated to other widely used socio-economic indicators like car ownership, social grade, social class, with the variance inflation scores for these variables (if added to existing models) being over 5. In order not to introduce multicollinearity to the analysis, we relied on home ownership as the only indicator of the constituency's socio-economic outlook.
Empirical Strategy
We implement two parallel sets of OLS models -one for the 2010 general election and one for the 2011 devolved elections -, with the per cent turnout for each 2010/2011 constituency as the dependent variable. Both sets of models are specified at constituency level.
The analyses in this paper are based on samples of 615 Westminster constituencies and 111
Holyrood/Welsh constituencies, respectively. The Speaker's constituency is excluded as it is traditionally not contested by major parties, while some constituencies are excluded because the Electoral Commission did not receive a full return from one or more of the major party candidates.
14

The Effects of Total Campaign Effort and Marginality on Political Participation
We begin by assessing the effects of overall campaign effort on turnout in the context of the 2010 general election (Model 1) and the 2011 devolved elections (Model 2). In line with previous studies, we find that greater mobilisation effort is associated with higher levels of turnout in both electoral contexts. With regard to the competitiveness of the race, our results
show that participation is higher in constituencies that are more marginal with regard to the general election of 2010. Such an effect, however, is not detected in the case of the devolved elections. This discrepancy is possibly due to differences in the electoral systems. Regardless of how competitive the first-past-the-post Holyrood/Welsh Assembly constituencies happen to be, all voters in the devolved elections have a competitive regional ballot to cast for multimember regional lists. This provides an incentive to go to the polling station even for those who are living in non-marginal first-past-the-post Holyrood/Welsh Assembly constituencies.
14 In addition, the analyses in this article exclude the constituencies in Northern Ireland. Turnout is also clearly not just a function of marginality and campaign effort. Among socioeconomic characteristics, higher rates of home ownership correspond with higher turnout.
The number of eligible voters, however, does not play a significant role. Where the two types of elections differ are the effects associated with density and single occupancy households.
We find significant effects for these two characteristics only in the context of the general election where higher levels of turnout are associated with greater population concentration and fewer people living as single occupants. Finally, regional differences exist: turnout is consistently lower in Wales (reference region for Models 1 and 2 are England and Scotland, respectively), although the difference is not statistically significant in the context of the general election.
In Figure 1 We turn our focus now to the potential interplay between campaign effort and marginality in order to uncover whether the effect of campaign effort is conditioned by the openness of the race. We explore such a dependency -or lack thereof -in Table 2 , where we show the results of the multiplicative models. The coefficients for the interaction terms in Model 3 and Model 4 are both insignificant. This indicates that the effectiveness of the mobilisation effort is not conditioned by the openness of the race. Our expectation on the moderating role of marginality is not met: campaign effort is equally beneficial in stimulating voter turnout in higher and lower competition contexts.
The wellbeing of a democracy relies on the levels of electoral participation and our findings show that, no matter how close a race is, citizens tend to participate more when a local, onthe-ground campaign provides information on the election.
Campaign Activities Vary in Their Capacity to Mobilise Voters
Having established that local campaigns do matter, we now assess whether different types of electioneering efforts vary in their ability to get out the vote. Similar to the previous analysis, we run separate models for the 2010 general election (5) and for the 2011 devolved elections (6) . Findings are presented in Table 3 below. The concluding message is clear and consistent across both electoral contexts: campaign activities differ notably in their capacity to mobilise the electorate and get out the vote. We do, however, detect some differences in the dynamics of voter mobilisation in the run up to the first-and second-order elections. Starting with a key similarity, the production and distribution of unsolicited materials is a good predictor of turnout in both electoral contexts. Clearly campaign material that reaches voters at their home and directly presents them with electorally relevant information has the capacity to stimulate electoral participation. At least some voters do respond to the stimulus provided by leaflets and campaign material in their letterboxes, indicating that electioneering does provide a meaningful link between politicians and voters. In terms of differences, Table 3 indicates that constituency-level turnout at the 2010 general election (unlike the 2011 devolved elections) is a function of the candidates' cumulative spending on staff as well as the production and distribution of unsolicited materials. The positive coefficient for staff suggests that, in the context of the general elections, more professional campaigns are better at persuading voters to cast their ballot. This is likely to enhance the recent trend of campaign professionalisation in Britain and beyond (Scammell 2014) . Overall, it is clear that campaign activities differ significantly in their capacity to mobilise voters both in the general and devolved elections in Britain. In Figure 2 below, we show the effects associated with those campaign activities that the empirical analysis proved to be effective in stimulating turnout, by election type. 
Conclusions
Our findings have key implications for those concerned with monitoring the status of democratic participation. Electoral participation appears to depend upon the overall campaign effort exerted by parties and their candidates. When this mobilisation effort is substantial, the returns are significant, with a higher proportion of voters choosing to cast their ballot. This applies equally to races of both low and high competiveness, suggesting that (if not to change the outcome of the election) mobilisation efforts put in place in the run up to the Election Day consistently lead to higher levels of electoral participation.
Our contribution is in three parts. Firstly, we have expanded on the existing literature by accounting for the efforts of all players on the ground. Considering the growing success and the substantial campaign efforts of the 'smaller' parties, they should not be excluded from future empirical assessments of the effectiveness of electioneering. The costs associated with the act of voting decrease when electorally relevant information is made available and that is not a prerogative of large parties only. Secondly, we have confirmed -in line with previous research (Fisher at al. 2015) -that not every type of campaign activity has an impact on voter turnout, and we have expanded this line of research to second-order elections. At secondorder elections, the only influential form of electioneering seems to be that of unsolicited material sent to voters, while money invested in paid staffers is also a good predictor of turnout at first-order elections (in addition to unsolicited materials) where greater levels of professionalisation within campaigns do help to mobilise the electorate. Thirdly, our empirical analysis has shown that first-and second-order elections in Britain are relatively homogenous when it comes to electoral mobilisation effects. Although baseline levels of turnout are higher at the general elections than the devolved elections, the effect of campaign activities on turnout is, after all, quite similar in the two electoral contexts. While still different in many respects, first-and second-order elections are not substantially dissimilar when it comes to the effects of local campaign efforts.
Our study has shed new light on the extent to which campaign visibility facilitates electoral participation in first-and second-order elections, but is certainly not without limitations. First and foremost, observational data do not address the mechanisms through which electioneering is internalised by voters and how it drives them to the polling station. Also, electoral returns are not designed by researchers in the same manner as surveys. The former an important part of every campaign. Despite these limits, electoral returns data enable us to expand our understanding of campaign processes and facilitate the comparative assessment of campaign effort.
In summary, as more electorally relevant information is disseminated in a constituency in the run up to the polling day, the costs of voting are reduced and, in turn, a greater proportion of the electorate feels sufficiently motivated to cast their ballot. This suggests that campaign efforts have a positive impact on internal efficacy and electoral participation. Importantly, this is the case in marginal as well as non-marginal constituencies, and at general elections as much as at second-order elections. Table B1 displays findings from models where previous turnout in the constituency is used to control for the constituency profile instead of marginality and socio-economic characteristics. Table B2 displays findings from models where campaign effort is operationalised in absolute terms -i.e., overall amount spent in the constituency in thousands of pounds. This measure does not account for the legal spending limit in the constituency. (Table 3) . Table B3 . Variance Inflation Factor Scores for Models in Table 1 and Table 3 Table B1 ). Table 3 ) or previous turnout (Models B1.3 and B1.4 in Table B1 ). 
